David H Yamamoto Deceased13199 El Dorado Dr UNIT 208B, Seal Beach, CA 90740

7524000, Apr 28, 2009

Dec 4, 2006

11/566585

David T. Yamamoto - Mill Creek WA, US
Neil T. Rapues - Lake Stevens WA, US
Tanong Nalamliang - Stanwood WA, US

The Boeing Company - Chicago IL

B60T 8/86

303126, 303199

A system and procedures for controlling a brake status indicator for an aircraft having an electric brake system are disclosed. Electric activation and deactivation of the brake status indicator mimics that of legacy hydraulic brake systems. The control methodology obtains brake force data that indicates actual clamping force of the electric brake actuators, parking brake lever status data that indicates whether the parking brake lever is raised or lowered, and parking brake activation data that indicates whether the parking brake mechanisms are active or inactive. The individual indicator elements of the brake status indicator are independently and concurrently controlled using multiple processing modules/channels of the electric brake system.

7857107, Dec 28, 2010

Nov 1, 2006

11/555630

David Yamamoto - Mill Creek WA, US
Erik Godo - Redmond WA, US
Joel T. Purificacion - Shoreline WA, US
Marcelino Montano - Snohomish WA, US

The Boeing Company - Chicago IL

B60T 13/64

188 3H, 303 15

A power management architecture as disclosed herein is suitable for use in connection with an electric brake system of an aircraft. During ground towing operations when the aircraft engines are off, the power management architecture provides operating power to the electric brake system (and other aircraft systems that are required to support towing operations) via the main aircraft battery. This towing power mode prevents the battery from powering other aircraft systems during towing operations, thus reducing the load on the battery.

8393689, Mar 12, 2013

Dec 22, 2006

11/615793

T. Todd Griffith - Seattle WA, US
David T. Yamamoto - Mill Creek WA, US
Andreea D. Uta - Mukilteo WA, US

The Boeing Company - Chicago IL

B60T 8/86

303126, 303 20

An electric autobrake interlock system for an aircraft includes an autobrake power interlock mechanism that prevents inadvertent (uncommanded) application of brakes. The autobrake power interlock removes operating power from the brake actuators whenever the autobrake actuation data does not indicate a legitimate autobrake application condition. The interlock processing occurs in parallel with the autobrake command processing such that even if an inadvertent autobrake command is generated, the brake actuators will be unable to act upon the inadvertent autobrake command. In this regard, the brake actuators are unable to apply brakes automatically unless the following two actions happen concurrently: the operating power is provided to enable the electric brake actuators and autobrake actuation control is commanded in response to the legitimate autobrake application condition.

2008003, Feb 7, 2008

Aug 4, 2006

11/462510

T. Todd Griffith - Seattle WA, US
David T. Yamamoto - Mill Creek WA, US
Erik L. Godo - Redmond WA, US

B60T 13/74

303 20, 303 3

An electric brake system architecture for an aircraft with two or more electrical braking subsystems including brake system controls configured to communicate pilot pedal commands to electric brake actuator controllers that apply or release brakes in wheel groups. The system allows independent brake activation of wheel groups through a plurality of brake system controls and electric brake actuator controllers. The electric braking system further includes remote data consolidators to collect and transmit wheel data to brake system controls through a digital data communication bus. The system reduces aircraft weight, prevents inadvertent braking, and prevents error propagation between subsystems.

2013011, May 9, 2013

Dec 12, 2012

13/712762

The Boeing Company - Seal Beach CA, US
David T. Yamamoto - Mill Creek WA, US
Andreea D. Uta - Bellevue WA, US

THE BOEING COMPANY - Seal Beach CA

B64C 25/44

701 3

An electric autobrake interlock system for an aircraft includes an autobrake power interlock mechanism that prevents inadvertent (uncommanded) application of brakes. The autobrake power interlock removes operating power from the brake actuators whenever the autobrake actuation data does not indicate a legitimate autobrake application condition. The interlock processing occurs in parallel with the autobrake command processing such that even if an inadvertent autobrake command is generated, the brake actuators will be enable to act upon the inadvertent autobrake command. In this regard, the brake actuators are unable to apply brakes automatically unless the following two actions happen concurrently: the operating power is provided to enable the electric brake actuators and autobrake actuation control is commanded in response to the legitimate autobrake application condition.

5505531, Apr 9, 1996

May 12, 1995

8/440161

Thomas T. Griffith - Seattle WA
David T. Yamamoto - Bothell WA

The Boeing Company - Seattle WA

B60T 886

303126

An aircraft autobrake system utilizes a hydraulic fluid pressure sensor to provide a signal proportional to brake hydraulic fluid pressure magnitude to a control system. The control system uses closed loop feedback of this pressure signal to control autobrake application. Such control avoids pressure or deceleration overshoot or undershoot caused by not achieving brake stack closure when deceleration control is applied. Upon landing, if autobrake control command plus the change in autobrake control command necessary to eliminate deceleration error is less than a specified minimum, then brake stack closure needs to be maintained. In that case, the control system determines hydraulic fluid pressure error and adjusts hydraulic fluid pressure to eliminate such pressure error, using closed loop feedback. Upon elimination of pressure error, indicating brake stack closure, deceleration control then applies autobraking to slow the aircraft without pressure or deceleration overshoot or undershoot. If upon landing, the autobrake control command plus the change in autobrake control command necessary to eliminate deceleration error is greater than a specified minimum, then deceleration control is used to apply braking and decelerate the aircraft.

5968106, Oct 19, 1999

Aug 5, 1997

8/906725

Garrett H. DeVlieg - Bellevue WA
Robert F. Mackness - Marysville WA
David T. Yamamoto - Bothell WA

The Boeing Company - Seattle WA

G05D 106

701 70

An aircraft automatic braking system processes the flight crew selected stopping position of the aircraft on the runway via a control display unit (30) and the aircraft's actual position, provided by a global positioning system (34), to generate a stop-to-position deceleration control signal in a provided control logic (36). If the flight crew selects the stop-to-position autobraking mode, the system determines whether or not a stop-to-position autobraking mode meets several predetermined criteria and, if the criteria are met, applies a control signal to the aircraft's braking system (62, 66) such that the aircraft is smoothly braked tending it to stop at the selected runway stopping position. The system eliminates the need for pilot lookup in a manual to determine a desired autobraking setting to choose based on altitude, temperature, approach speed and runway conditions and also operates to reduce pilot workload during limited visibility conditions.

2022021, Jul 7, 2022

Sep 8, 2021

17/468885

- Chicago IL, US
David T. Yamamoto - Mill Creek WA, US
Levi Aren Mulkey - Chicago IL, US

B60T 8/88
B60T 7/04
B60T 8/17
B60T 8/174
B60T 8/171

A brake system control unit includes one or more sensor interfaces configured to receive a brake torque signal from a brake torque sensor. The brake system control unit also includes a torque estimator configured to generate an estimated brake torque signal based, at least in part, on a brake model and a brake actuator command. The brake system control unit further includes control circuitry configured to generate the brake actuator command to actuate a brake actuator of a brake system. The brake actuator command is generated based on a brake pedal command and a load alleviation command The load alleviation command is based on the brake torque or the estimated brake torque signal, depending on whether a sensor fault condition associated with the brake torque sensor is detected.