Dipankar G Gupta, 594 Lake Rd UNIT 5, Irvine, CA 92614

6378070, Apr 23, 2002

Jan 8, 1999

09/227162

David Chan - Bristol, GB
Dipankar Gupta - Sunnyvale CA
Bruno Edgard Van Wilder - Bristol, GB

Hewlett-Packard Company - Palo Alto CA

G06F 0124

713155, 713165, 380255

In a distributed computing environment, a user is able to send a document to a secure printer ( ) in such a way that only a specified intended recipient can print the document. When the user specifies that the document is to be printed securely, a special print job is created in which the document is encrypted using a session key and a bulk encryption algorithm, and the session key is encrypted using the intended recipients public key. Then, the encrypted session key, the encrypted document and an indication of the intended recipients identity is transmitted to a print server ( ), where the print job is held. When the recipients smart card ( ) is inserted into a smart card reader of the secure printer ( ), the recipients identity, taken from the smart card ( ), is transmitted to the print server ( ). The print server uses the identity to search for and retrieve documents intended for the recipient. If the recipient is the intended recipient, the encrypted document and encrypted session key are transmitted to the secure printer ( ).

6446051, Sep 3, 2002

Feb 11, 1999

09/248676

Dipankar Gupta - Sunnyvale CA

Hewlett-Packard Company - Palo Alto CA

H04L 900

705 52, 705 51, 705 55, 380 45, 380 55

A document transfer system enabling a consumer to obtain a document from an owner upon payment using a cryptographic protocol involving the consumer, the owner, a document source, such as printer, and a mediator, according to which protocol the consumer requests a document, the owner provides the source with first and third portions of the key and provides the mediator with a fourth portion of the key, which fourth portion can combine with said first portion to generate the complete key, the consumer provides the owner with the payment and the owner provides the source with a second portion of the key which can combine with said first portion to generate the complete key. A printer for use in the above system, the printer comprising a document memory for storing a received encrypted document, a key memory for storing a first cryptographic key portion, a processor for receiving a second cryptographic key portion and combining it with the first key portion to form a complete cryptographic key which is supplied to a decrypting module. The encrypted document is supplied to the decrypting module whereupon the document is decrypted and supplied to the consumer.

6988250, Jan 17, 2006

Feb 15, 2000

09/913452

Graeme John Proudler - Bristol, GB
Dipankar Gupta - Fort Collins CO, US
Liqun Chen - Bristol, GB
Siani Lynne Pearson - Bristol, GB
Boris Balacheff - Bristol, GB
Bruno Edgard Van Wilder - Aalst, BE
David Chan - Monte Sereno CA, US

Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. - Houston TX

G06F 17/50

716 1, 716 18, 705 50, 713160, 713165

In a computing platform, a trusted hardware device () is added to the motherboard (). The trusted hardware device () is configured to acquire an integrity metric, for example a hash of the BIOS memory (), of the computing platform. The trusted hardware device () is tamper-resistant, difficult to forge and inaccessible to other functions of the platform. The hash can be used to convince users that that the operation of the platform (hardware or software) has not been subverted in some way, and is safe to interact with in local or remote applications. In more detail, the main processing unit () of the computing platform is directed to address the trusted hardware device (), in advance of the BIOS memory, after release from ‘reset’. The trusted hardware device () is configured to receive memory read signals from the main processing unit () and, in response, return instructions, in the native language of the main processing unit (), that instruct the main processing unit to establish the hash and return the value to be stored by the trusted hardware device (). Since the hash is calculated in advance of any other system operations, this is a relatively strong method of verifying the integrity of the system.

7058605, Jun 6, 2006

Jan 18, 2002

10/052363

Dipankar Gupta - Sunnyvale CA, US

Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. - Houston TX

H04I 9/00
G06F 17/00

705 51, 705 50, 705 71, 705 59, 705 64, 705 55, 380 45, 380 55

A document transfer system enabling a consumer to obtain a document from an owner upon payment uses a cryptographic protocol involving the consumer, the owner, a document source, such as a printer, and a mediator.

7444601, Oct 28, 2008

Oct 12, 2005

11/249820

Graeme John Proudler - Bristol, GB
Dipankar Gupta - Fort Collins CO, US
Liqun Chen - Bristol, GB
Siani Lynne Pearson - Bristol, GB
Boris Balacheff - Bristol, GB
Bruno Edgard Van Wilder - Aalst, BE
David Chan - Monte Sereno CA, US

Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. - Houston TX

G06F 17/50

716 1, 716 16, 716 17, 716 18

In a computing platform, a trusted hardware device () is added to the motherboard (). The trusted hardware device () is configured to acquire an integrity metric, for example a hash of the BIOS memory (), of the computing platform. The trusted hardware device () is tamper-resistant, difficult to forge and inaccessible to other functions of the platform. The hash can be used to convince users that that the operation of the platform (hardware or software) has not been subverted in some way, and is safe to interact with in local or remote applications. In more detail, the main processing unit () of the computing platform is directed to address the trusted hardware device (), in advance of the BIOS memory, after release from ‘reset’. The trusted hardware device () is configured to receive memory read signals from the main processing unit () and, in response, return instructions, in the native language of the main processing unit (), that instruct the main processing unit to establish the hash and return the value to be stored by the trusted hardware device (). Since the hash is calculated in advance of any other system operations, this is a relatively strong method of verifying the integrity of the system.

7512703, Mar 31, 2009

Jan 31, 2003

10/355118

Yong Boon Ho - Fort Collins CO, US
Srikanth Natarajan - Fort Collins CO, US
Dipankar Gupta - Fort Collins CO, US

Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. - Houston TX

G06F 15/173

709238

A system and associated method of storing data concerning a computer network are disclosed. Mesh information concerning a mesh of nodes in the computer network is produced. The mesh information indicates that an interface of the mesh is an external mesh interface, and the mesh information is stored.

7925201, Apr 12, 2011

Apr 13, 2007

11/735262

William Irvin - Laguna Beach CA, US
Chad E. Steelberg - Newport Beach CA, US
Ryan S. Steelberg - Irvine CA, US
Matt Chalawsky - Los Angeles CA, US
Dipankar Gupta - Irvine CA, US
Bradley D. Townsend - Irvine CA, US
Jeffrey W. Houston - Lake Forest CA, US

Wideorbit, Inc. - San Francisco CA

H04H 60/09
H04H 40/00
H04M 3/42
H04M 1/725
H04B 7/00

455 301, 455 306, 455 661, 455344, 4554141

Sharing media content among families of broadcast stations includes receiving information relating to media content from families of broadcast stations, storing the information such that the information is accessible to at least two of the families of broadcast stations via a computer network, receiving a query for specific media content from a broadcast station, searching the stored information in accordance with the query to identify the specific media content; and enabling the broadcast station to access to the specific media content if the specific media content is identified among the stored information.

7957364, Jun 7, 2011

Jan 24, 2006

11/338528

Aaron J. Loyd - Cupertino CA, US
Srikanth Natarajan - Cupertino CA, US
Dipankar Gupta - Cupertino CA, US

Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. - Houston TX

H04L 12/28

370351, 370248

In an embodiment of a method of tracing a path through a switch mesh from a first device connected to the switch mesh to a second device connected to the switch mesh, hardware addresses of the first and second devices are obtained. At least one switch that is a neighbor to the first device is identified. At least one switch that is a neighbor to the first device is queried to identify at least one port of at least one switch that is forwarding packets having the hardware addresses of the first and second devices.